Hidden champions and unicorns: a question of the context of human capital investment by Lehmann, Erik E. et al.
1 
 
Main Street Entrepreneurship and Hidden Champions: A Question of the 
Context of Human Capital Investment 
 
Erik E. Lehmann1, Julian Schenkenhofer2, & Katharine Wirsching3 
 
Abstract 
The Silicon Valley model of high-tech entrepreneurship has been placed in the spotlight by 
academics in the past at the expense of the plenitude of Main Street businesses – businesses 
beyond the high-tech and ICT sector and the highly scalable platform economy. This study aims 
at resolving this one-sidedness contributing to unexplained aspects of entrepreneurship theory. 
Our focus lies on a subgroup of Main Street companies, known as hidden champions, as the 
counterpart of Silicon Valley high-growth firms, the unicorns. In spite of a worldwide 
distribution, just as unicorns are highly skewed to a few countries and regions, so are hidden 
champions. On a snapshot, it appears that unicorns and hidden champions are substitutes rather 
than complementary to one another. We illustrate that the emergence and skewed distribution 
of these two types of firms can be explained by the institutional context, in particular the 
provision of human capital. In an explorative approach, our line of reasoning puts forward that 
the centralization (public provision) vs. decentralization (individual investment) in organizing 
the accumulation of human capital helps to explain the different and path dependent evolution 
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The American economy is in a constant state of churn, being viewed as one of the world`s most 
entrepreneurial, dynamic and flexible economies. It changed its focus away from a managed 
economy toward the direction of an entrepreneurial economy, where knowledge is the main 
source of competitive advantage (Audretsch and Thurik 2004). In the sense of Schumpeter, this 
dynamism and flexibility has enabled the U.S. economy to adapt to changing economic 
circumstances and recover from recessions in a robust manner. In a dynamic economy, firm 
entry and exit constantly force labor and capital to be put to better uses. The financial crisis of 
2007/08 however revealed that the U.S. economy has become less dynamic since the end of the 
1990s. The declining business startup rates and the resulting diminished role for dynamic, 
young businesses in the economy illustrate this development (Decker, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and 
Miranda 2016). The year 2008, the end of the financial crisis, marks a turning point in the 
entrepreneurial economy. For the first time, the number of firm entries falls below the number 
of firm exits (U.S. Census Bureau, 2017). Since WW2, the U.S. economy has had its slowest 
economic recovery after a recession (Bonvillian 2017, p. 7), putting the faith in the system at 
stake.   
 “Is America encouraging the wrong kind of entrepreneurship?”, Litan and Hathaway (2017) 
ask in a Harvard Business Review article. Have entrepreneurship scholars narrowed their focus 
just on the benefits of the few high-tech and high-growth firms, like unicorns (Acs, Stam, 
Audretsch, and O’Connor 2017), while glossing over the costs, such as the crowding out of 
ordinary business start-ups? Have we been solving problems for the less than 1% of technology 
startups, neglecting the fact that the United States still is a nation of small businesses? To put 
this in perspective, 99.7% of the ~6 million companies in the U.S. have less than 500 employees 
and employ 50% of the 121 million U.S. workers getting a paycheck, and accounted for 65% 
of the 15 million net new jobs created between 1993 and 2000 (Morelix, Tareque, Fairlie, 
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Russell, and Reedy 2016). Against this backdrop, the question arises why these companies have 
not been the focus for scholars and the public in the past. Only in the past years, a fruitful and 
promising research agenda has thus evolved analyzing how contextual variables shape and 
moderate the evolution of different models of entrepreneurship and business (Welter and 
Gartner 2016).  
This study fits into this stream of literature and explores how the development of firm types and 
their varying business models are shaped by context, especially different patterns of human 
capital investment. In the Anglo-Saxon system, the Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship 
has become popular as the leading paradigm throughout policy agendas, media news programs 
and the mindsets of corporate managers (Acs, Braunerhjelm, Audretsch, and Carlsson 2009; 
Audretsch 2009; Audretsch and Keilbach 2004). In the shade of the outstanding success of the 
Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship, another type of firm has been evolving in Europe 
since the 1970s. Both systems succeeded in prime examples of businesses: Unicorns from Wall 
Street, next to the hidden champions located on Main Street. Hermann Simon coined the term 
hidden champion in 1990 (Simon 1990). He broadly defines a company as a hidden champion, 
if they are number 1, 2 or 3 worldwide in their market niches or at least the market leader in 
their home continent, and are almost hidden, largely unknown by the public, and they post 
revenues below 4 billion € (Audretsch and Lehmann 2016, pp. 30-35). The last criterion is 
qualitative, implying that hidden champions are often owner-managed, rarely publicly listed, 
often operate in B2B-markets and are rooted in the (most often rural) regions in which they 
were established. Unicorns instead are start-up companies valued above $1 billion USD and 
thus form a small group of elites within the population of start-ups that is able to scale-up their 
business, often by building a platform on which others can create and exchange value (Acs et 
al., 2017), such as Airbnb, Uber, Snapchat, Spotify or Twitter.  
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We rest our arguments on recent refinements made by Coff and Raffiee (2015), questioning the 
oversimplifying dichotomy of general and firm-specific human capital and its consequences for 
investment behavior as initially proposed by Becker (1964) (Nyberg and Wright 2015). We 
apply their argument to explain how hidden champions have evolved in the last decades and 
how this has paved the way for their sustained economic success. Our line of reasoning adds to 
the literature on human capital (Coff and Raffiee 2015) by illustrating that an element of the 
institutional context, the centralization or decentralization of human capital investment, helps 
explain the different and path dependent evolution of both the Silicon Valley (unicorns) and 
the Main Street model of entrepreneurship (hidden champions).  
Our study aims at resolving this one-sidedness contributing to unexplained aspects of 
entrepreneurship theory. In the remainder of the paper, we first describe the skewed distribution 
of unicorns and hidden champions (section 2), before section 3 analyzes how different contexts 
influence human capital investments. After section 4 illustrates the diverse evolvement of both 
the Silicon and Main Street model of entrepreneurship, section 5 addresses implications of our 
arguments and discusses opportunities resulting from a combination of both models. Section 6 
concludes. 
2. THE SKEWED DISTRIBUTION OF UNICORNS AND HIDDEN CHAMPIONS 
A very small portion of startup firms in the US and elsewhere become what have been labeled 
unicorns. These firms emerge in a very limited number of places around the globe and their 
distribution is highly skewed, reflecting different institutional contexts are necessary to grow. 
Table 1 lists the number of unicorns per country in the world. Silicon Valley (including cities 
such as San Francisco, Palo Alto, and Mountain View, but also Greater Los Angeles), is the 
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world leader in high growth companies, with at least a third (64) of all (170) unicorns globally4. 
With a total of 101 unicorns, more than every second unicorn is hosted in the U.S., followed 
by China with a total of 35 billion dollar start-ups. The U.K. (including Scotland) hosts 8, and 
Continental Europe 10. The overwhelming success of the Silicon Valley model of 
entrepreneurship in generating, financing, and scaling up of unicorns (IT giants like Google 
(Alphabet), Amazon, or Facebook) is not carved in stone. The underlying business models can 
sometimes be copied and pasted, as shown by the astonishing success of unicorns in China like 
Alibaba, Tencent, Baidu, or Didi. These firms are often ‘twins’ to their U.S. originals, 
competing with their U.S. counterparts worldwide for users, customers and resources; and like 
Tencent, they can even surpass their originals (Facebook) in stock market value and revenues.  
- Insert table 1 about here - 
While scholars have intensively studied high-tech entrepreneurial firms, Main Street companies 
have only received scarce interest (Audretsch and Lehmann 2016, pp. 30-35; De Massis, 
Audretsch, Uhlaner, and Kammerlander 2017). Main Street Entrepreneurship concentrates on 
a wide range of self-employed businesses (Morris, Neumeyer, and Kuratko 2015). We suggest 
a typology that ranges between the small ‘mom and pop’ businesses, resembling the Kauffman 
Foundation’s definition of Main Street Entrepreneurship, and hidden champions. According to 
the Kauffman Index of Main Street Entrepreneurship, Morelix et al. (2016, p. 3) define Main 
Street ‘mom and pop’ businesses as “one with fewer than fifty employees and in existence for 
longer than five years”. ‘Mom and pop’ businesses thus consist of the plenitude of ordinary 
restaurants, hotels or breweries, among many others. The other end of the Main Street spectrum 
is marked by companies that are far bigger in size and were made famous by Simon (1990): the 
hidden champions. Their long-term orientation, firm involvement and regional embeddedness 
                                                 




are characteristics that in general are taken from the ‘family business’ literature (De Massis, 
Frattini, Kotlar, Petruzzelli, and Wright 2016; Le Breton-Miller and Miller 2006; Zellweger 
and Sieger 2012), overlooking the complementarity of these items.  
The distribution of hidden champions however is highly skewed, too. As they pursue a niche 
strategy, hidden champions require a unique set of complementary institutional variables. 
Therefore, the business model of hidden champions centrally revolves around at least three core 
elements: their specific, knowledge-intensive product, their decentralized organization and their 
highly international nature (Audretsch, Lehmann and Schenkenhofer 2018), which all of them 
call for high and specific human capital. Beyond, these companies are special due to their 
internal R&D investments, their high product and service quality, their efficiency (total cost of 
ownership), their export orientation, their long-term orientation, their high profit margin, and 
last but not least, their almost entire rural distribution (Audretsch and Lehmann 2016, pp. 30-
35).  
- Insert figure 1 about here - 
About 50% of all hidden champions are located in Germany, followed by the U.S. with 366 
(14%), Japan 220 (8%), Austria 116 (4%) and Switzerland 110 (4%) (see figure 1). When 
correcting for country size effects, the picture remains the same, with the distribution of the 
hidden champions being highly skewed and concentrated in Continental Europe and 
Scandinavia. A peak can also be found in Asian countries (Japan, South Korea, and China). In 
contrast, Anglo-Saxon countries rather are underrepresented.  
Per definition, hidden champions are market leaders, either on their continent or worldwide, in 
their respective industries and niches. Being too small to compete only on prices, hidden 
champions capture their markets by offering highly complex and value-adding goods and 
services. Quality instead of price leadership leads to a quasi-monopolistic situation, making a 
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company less prone to external shocks, disruption and business cycles, but this also requires 
highly skilled labor. This labor workforce, beyond just engineers from universities, requires 
workers that are well educated and trained both on and off the job, which has almost been 
neglected in the U.S. in the past decades (Harhoff and Kane 1997; Lewis 2007; Bosch and 
Charest 2008).  
Compelling evidence suggests that different institutional and cultural contexts (Bradley and 
Klein 2016; Bruton, Ahlstrom, and Li 2010; Welter and Gartner 2016) result in a skewed 
distribution of firm characteristics like age, size, location or industries across countries. The 
highly skewed distribution of hidden champion companies suggests that country-specific 
effects, like different law systems underlie (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny 
1998). A central prediction of this literature is that new ventures on the one hand, and large and 
public corporations on the other discriminate against medium sized firms. This common version 
is based on the claim that small and medium sized firms are credit constrained, while large 
firms are not (Lehmann and Neuberger 2001). Liquid financial markets, like in common law 
system (Anglo-Saxon) countries favor equity financing of new ventures and large and 
established companies (Audretsch and Lehmann 2004; Lehmann and Weigand 2000; Evans 
and Jovanovic 1989; Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian, and Rosen 1994).  
While access to, and costs of, financial capital is an important and scarce resource, this literature 
almost neglects another important source of capital that is also shaped by different law systems 
– human capital. Countries not only differ according to their legal rules that shape the costs and 
provision of financial resources, but also by public funding and access to well-trained and 
educated human capital. It is undisputed that higher education has become increasingly tied to 
economic wellbeing and that continuously advancing in an economy requires an ever-
increasing level of technological skill in the workforce (Autor 2014; Goldin and Katz 2009). 
The production of highly complex, high quality and value-adding products requires both the 
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ability to obtain capital to invest in research & development but also in machines and tools, and 
a high technological skill base that is complementary to the implemented technology. In a 
technologically advanced economy, the societal skill base curve must stay parallel to and ahead 
of the technology implementation curve – this requires a system of mass higher education on 
the firm level.  
The skewed distribution of hidden champions should thus be interpreted in this way, too. There 
are at least two different ways to ensure and guarantee the technological skill base needed, 
public or private investments. Figure 2 depicts how the public mass education system 
discriminates according to the distribution of hidden champions. Countries are ranked 
according their willingness to invest in mass higher education and provide minimum standards 
for the graduation rate. The rankings are 0, 1 or 2.  
- Insert figure 2 about here - 
At the forefront is Germany, with its worldwide honored model of the dual apprentice system, 
where duality expresses the combination of practical and theoretical knowledge. The two key 
features of the dual apprenticeship system are firm-based training programs accompanied by a 
school-based component in which apprentices acquire upper secondary general education and 
theoretical knowledge in their training occupation (German Federal Ministry of Education and 
Research, 2018; Kuhlee, 2015). Other kinds of dual apprenticeship systems are found in 
Austria, Switzerland, Denmark, Norway, Luxembourg and the Netherlands (Hoeckel and 
Schwartz 2010). Like Germany, these countries also host a high percentage of hidden 
champions, when corrected for country size effects. To guarantee a level of quality, the 
vocational education training in these countries is centralized on the state level, organized and 
controlled by decentralized, semi-public chambers of commerce (Greinert 2005; Jahn 2015). In 
contrast, Anglo-Saxon countries are characterized by a decentralized education system on the 
firm level, where public spending in vocational education is kept to a minimum. Interestingly, 
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these countries show a rather low percentage of hidden champions. However, the number of 
unicorns is highest in these countries, and lowest in Continental Europe. Asian countries, like 
China, Japan, and South Korea, but also some Scandinavian countries (Sweden) are 
characterized by centrality of vocational training and education programs and schools, without 
linking theoretical knowledge and practical applications. At a first glance, the organization of 
vocational education by the centralized vs. decentralized argument may help to explain the 
distribution of hidden champions and unicorns beyond the traditional law systems. Thus, 
duality could also be interpreted as a combination of general and firm-specific human capital. 
3. A QUESTION OF THE CONTEXT OF HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT 
3.1. Main Street entrepreneurship - the road less travelled? 
In the end of the 1970s, the U.S. developed a new innovation system based on venture capital 
for entrepreneurial start-up firms, implementing the ICT and biotech innovation waves with 
Silicon Valley as the role model for an entrepreneurial ecosystem (Bonvillian 2017, p. 2). That 
venture system has now largely shifted to support software and internet firms, and has 
abandoned startups planning to manufacture hard technologies, fencing off manufacturing firms 
from its venture-based innovation system. However, manufacturing is a critical element in a 
country’s innovation system, in particular the direct link between innovation and production, 
where a great array of skills and firms are involved in the lengthy and complex value chain in 
the production of goods and services. Each full-time equivalent job in manufacturing dedicated 
to producing value for final demand creates 3.4 full-time equivalent jobs in nonmanufacturing 
industries – a multiplier far higher than in any other sector. For every value-added dollar of 
domestic manufacturing destined for manufactured goods for final demand, another $3.6 of 
value-added is generated elsewhere in the economy (ibd. 2017, p. 18). Removing the production 
element in manufacturing, the value chains of connected companies are snapped and face 
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significant disruption. The loss of nearly 6 million jobs in the United States since 2000 has also 
been damaging the stock of knowledge and human capital in this sector (ibd. 2017, p. 6).  
This development contrasts the approach to manufacturing R&D taken by Germany (or 
Continental Europe), Japan and China, where the Main Street entrepreneurs have evolved into 
hidden champions. While companies like Starbucks, Google, Facebook and Amazon, among 
others, are by far drivers of innovation and world trade in services, world trade in goods is still 
four times the amount of trade in services.5 Thus, success in a highly competitive world rewards 
regions and nations that produce complex, value-added goods and sell them through 
international trade – which is why studying hidden champions should be as important, if not 
more important, as studying unicorns (Welter, Baker, Audretsch, and Gartner 2017).  
To explain why Main Street entrepreneurship is the road less travelled in the U.S. in contrast to 
Continental Europe, we also have to look at what has happened at ground level, where the two 
roads diverged.  
3.2. The paradox in the provision of general and firm-specific human capital 
There is broad consensus in the strategy literature that human capital is a main source of 
sustainable competitive advantage, albeit there is still an open and fruitful discussion about the 
kind of human capital, i.e. general or firm-specific (Campbell, Coff, and Kryscynski 2012; Coff 
and Raffiee 2015). Human capital, the stock of knowledge, skills and abilities acquired by 
workers by either training or education, add economic value to enterprises. Human capital could 
be either general or firm-specific. In the first case, general human capital adds value in different 
firms and industries, like accounting skills, while firm-specific human capital is considered 
worthless outside the specific firm, like skills necessary for specific machines (Coff and Raffiee 
2015). General and firm-specific human capital are both strongly linked to market 
                                                 




imperfections on the demand and supply side (Molloy and Barney 2015). When it comes to the 
classic investment dilemma articulated by Williamson (1975), the investment decision between 
firm-specific and general skills is a choice made by the employee and the employer. When the 
human capital is indispensably linked to the individual, when it is intrinsically part of him, who 
will or should invest in the individual’s human capital or ought to have the responsibility of 
investing in it or the enjoyment of its benefits? According to Becker (1964) it is irrational for a 
firm to fund general human capital like employee training schemes, as its inherent value is at 
risk with agents reneging on the vague promise of relation specific investments (Fleming 2017). 
To this effect, employees will be reluctant to make investments in firm-specific human capital 
to avoid a wage penalty from mobility (Campbell et al. 2012), but are willing to invest in general 
human capital to increase their outside opportunities. On a theoretical basis, this dilemma leads 
to underinvestment in human capital, with adverse consequences for the whole economy. One 
way to solve this kind of market imperfection is the provision of a public good – vocational 
education provided by the government (governmental investments in people’s skills), a state-
funded tertiary education system. Countries differ worldwide in their ability and willingness to 
provide general and specific human capital as a public good, and they further differ on whether 
the provision is organized on a central, state-level, or decentralized on the firm level.  
Summing up, public policy has been about divesting in people, in particular in the Anglo-Saxon 
countries. That is why the Silicon Valley Model of entrepreneurship has evolved so successfully 
on the one hand and the Main Street hidden champions’ model on the other hand. 
3.3. Historical roots – there is no free lunch 
Assuming that academic research in entrepreneurship doesn’t follow a random walk but is more 
or less path dependent, recent phenomenon’s requests that the historical context could not be 
faded out (Wadhwani 2017). So why have academics narrowed their view to the Silicon Valley 
model of entrepreneurship? One answer to this question dates back to the 1960s, the hour of 
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birth of modern human capital theory, where an intensive debate had occurred at the University 
of Chicago, whether the provision of human capital is a public good or not.6 While other 
countries kept the model of public investment in education, the U.S. drastically reduced public 
investment in education, fostering entrepreneurship and the self-responsibility of individuals to 
invest in their human capital. Following the argument raised by Friedman (1962) and Becker 
(1964) mentioned further above, profit-maximizing firms would be reluctant to invest in 
education and training methods. Hence, public spending on education and training should close 
this skill gap and enrich the countries skill reserves.  
Friedman (1962), an advocate of free market competition, individualism, freedom and 
glorifying the self-made entrepreneur, channeled the human capital debate towards a political 
debate contrasting the entrepreneurial and capitalist U.S. system with the social planning system 
of Russia (Fleming 2017). Returns on human capital derived from public investment ought to 
remain in public hands, which resembles the socialist way of thinking. If human capital could 
not be separated from the individual, then returns from human capital derived from public 
investment, the individual receives a gift from the taxpayer. In this case, the individual should 
bear some or all the investment costs of human capital. If the individual is already the owner of 
his own production technology, his human capital, knowledge, skills, and abilities, then the 
presumed conflict at the heart of the capitalist labor process logically dissolves – the individual 
has become a de facto capitalist by the acquisition of knowledge, skills and abilities. The 
underlying message of human capital theory turns out to be simple, what Friedman summed up 
in the catch phrase that ‘there is no such thing as a free lunch’.   
Since then, the Anglo-Saxon countries and Continental Europe took different roads, shifting 
their economies on different paths. Tax incentives continuously channel investments in 
entrepreneurial firms that in turn increases stock-market liquidity, stimulating IPOs as an exit 
                                                 
6 See Fleming (2017) for a detailed and precise analysis of this human capital controversy in the 1960s. 
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strategy. With the number of publicly traded domestic companies in the U.S. growing radically, 
the share of household wealth going into stocks exploded from about 5% in the 1980s, to some 
30% at the end of the 1990s (Zuckerman 1998). Zuckerman (1998, pp. 22-23) comments 
pointedly that “entrepreneurialism and individual initiative in this country are so widely 
accepted” and that “the achievements of business in America grew out of a culture that has long 
valued individualism, entrepreneurialism, pragmatism, and novelty.” 
Investment and production of human capital has long lasting and path dependent historical roots 
in Continental European and Scandinavian countries. In the 14th century, a system of guilds 
has emerged; a unification of companies and craftsmen for each industry, like jewelry, tailors, 
smiths, clock builders, or gun makers. This kind of collusion controlled not only the market 
entry and the location policy of an urban district, but in particular guaranteed and fostered the 
investment in general and firm-specific human capital. Since ever, firm or industry specific 
human capital was seen as a strategic competitive advantage and therefore has been protected 
and kept within the guild. Employee retention was enforced by legal rules and the extraction of 
power. Employees in industries with strategic importance for the city or state, like in the 
production of weapons and arms, are hindered to leave the company by their live, during that 
time, investment in firm-specific human capital created a hold-up problem as described in Coff 
and Raffiee (2015) and mobility was directly linked to wage reduction, in the case of losing its 
life. The incentive to invest in firm-specific human capital and knowledge is always shaped by 
the expected net benefits compared to the outside opportunities. Since then, firms invest in 
training and educating their employees, to guarantee a skill-based workforce. This tradition has 
survived since the middle age within guilds, but also incorporated in the plenty of firms existing 
for hundreds of years (Audretsch and Lehmann 2016). 
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4. HUMAN CAPITAL INVESTMENT AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE SILICON 
VALLEY AND MAIN STREET MODEL OF ENTREPRENEURSHIP 
4.1. The evolvement of the Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship 
The technology push in the ICT sector in the 1970s has led to several spin-offs in the semi-
conductor industry from companies like Fairchild or IBM by engineers who felt unsatisfied 
with their mother companies in applying and fostering these new technological challenges 
(Almeida and Kogut 1997; Klepper 2011). Like a chain reaction, the number of start-ups 
exploded in the Silicon Valley, where now large and established firms co-exist with young and 
entrepreneurial firms evolving an entrepreneurial ecosystem, where scarce resources are 
efficiently exchanged among the different parties. Mobility of employees not just occurred by 
moving to rival firms, but by spin-offs and founding new ventures. 
Despite the diversity of firms, the firm-specific knowledge of the first hour, skills in computing 
and software has evolved to general knowledge. The skill base in the last decade represents a 
myriad of young people growing up with programming languages and their new applications 
and their derivatives. Abilities, skills, and knowledge are appropriated by observing peers, 
freely available instructions on YouTube and just self-learning by trail-and-error. This 
generation represents the new ‘blue collar’ workforce, the technological skill base in the 
workforce needed to support the ever-growing curve of technological advance implemented by 
platform start-ups, as the unicorns. 
The observed high mobility of employees in the start-up scene raises the question of whether 
the human capital embodied in these employees is firm-specific or rather general. As Coff and 
Raffiee (2015) point out, employees with firm-specific skills are unlikely to use these skills 
successfully without the focal firm’s complementary assets. Otherwise, the total value 
associated with their productivity would be lower in the rivalry firm leading to a wage 
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reduction. The high mobility of employees observed in the Silicon Valley (but also in other 
dense clusters of start-ups) leads to several implications: that the human capital of employees 
in high-tech firms is less firm-specific than assumed, that the complementary assets of high-
tech entrepreneurial firms are less firm-specific and that neither employees nor entrepreneurial 
companies think about human capital in terms of firm specificity and its implication on wages 
and remuneration (Coff and Raffiee 2015).  
What drives firm performance in the end is the access to critical resources, as human and 
financial capital. Investors rationally tend to invest in companies with the highest expected 
return on their investment. Since firm risk and expected returns are correlated, equity investors7 
tend to invest in new ventures with expected higher profits. Herd behavior among investors and 
overestimation of future profits lead to the highly skewed distribution of high-tech firms – the 
unicorns, which receive a market value above $1 billion within a short time after they are 
founded. This induces a competition for skilled labor, rendering concerns on general or firm-
specific knowledge or human capital to a more or less theoretical discussion (Groysberg 2010; 
Groysberg, Lee, and Nanda 2008). Strategic and competitive advantages are less based on how 
the technological skill base is creating sustainable values to the complementary assets of a firm, 
but on how the business model could be scaled up on the demand; the customer side.  
Fascinated by this hype, scholars therefore have focused their research interest towards this 
entrepreneurial ecosystem, analyzing all aspects ranging from knowledge spillovers to new 
venture creation and failing, financing and exit decisions, governance aspects or new business 
                                                 
7 This directly follows from the famous Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) model on credit rationing. While the expected 
profits increase with the riskiness of the firm’s project, this also leads to adverse selection (high risk firms) and 
moral hazard (gambling for resurrection) effects. The equilibrium is an interest rate at a given level of riskiness, 
which leads to credit rationing for higher risk firms. Since creditors could not benefit from the ‘upside risk’ 
(when firms over-perform) but bear the downside risk (the costs of failure and bankruptcy) they could not trade 
off these costs and benefits. Equity investors however could trade-off the risk and benefits of their investment by 
increasing their portfolio. 
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model creation. In such an ecosystem, there would be no place for Main Street entrepreneurship 
beyond a ground level.  
4.2. The evolvement of the Main Street model of entrepreneurship  
The European Union, in particular countries like France, Germany or Italy have long been 
trying to copy the Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship – without great success but not for 
nothing. While they have been successful in establishing several industry clusters in different 
regions, they failed in building a Silicon Valley, which works like a perpetual mobile, 
generating and disgorging new companies, partially by swelling and absorbing the resources 
set free from the failing forerunners. Why have we observed such a divergence in the 
development of industries and firms between the U.S. and Continental Europe since the 1970? 
The dual apprenticeship in Germany, where half of the hidden champions are located 
worldwide, serves as an institutional mechanism to overcome the hold-up and moral hazard 
problem generated by the general and firm-specific character of human capital. German 
apprenticeship training takes place in public vocational schools, teaching theoretical 
knowledge, and private firms, training apprentices in practical skills, i.e. firm-specific skills 
and knowledge. Creating graduates with theoretical – general – and practical – firm-specific – 
knowledge, the German apprenticeship system thus ensures and guarantees a technological skill 
base in the workforce needed to support the production of high quality services and products. 
While firms’ participation in the apprenticeship is voluntarily, once decided to participate, they 
are subject to the laws of apprenticeship training (Jahn 2015). The Chambers of Commerce and 
Industry or Crafts first check whether firms meet the official training standards to train 
apprentices and, since apprentices have to pass an official job-related exam, guarantee a level 
of quality in training and education.  
Almost half of the hidden champions were founded after World War II, and many of their ‘birth’ 
dates go back to the mid-1970s (Simon 2009), the time, when the first high-tech enterprises like 
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Intel were founded in the Silicon Valley. While the U.S. started in disinvesting in the provision 
of public funded human capital, the Continental Europe and Scandinavian countries increased 
their efforts in public mass education. A focus was put on the provision of general human capital 
in different levels. Education was seen as a free lunch for the individual benefitting from the 
costless access to human capital, paid like a gift from the taxpayer. While the government 
provides general human capital, abilities and skills, further firm-specific knowledge and skills 
is needed beyond.  
Hidden champions are champions since they outperform their control groups in the growth of 
market shares (hidden champions 34%, control group: 13%), sales (11%, 8%), exports (64%, 
34%) or profit margin (Rammer and Spielkamp 2015). Entrepreneurial orientation is inherent; 
the search for product and process improvements lies in the genes of hidden champions and 
encompasses all hierarchies. Their strong and long-lasting relationship to key clients and 
suppliers offers a base for new opportunities in new markets all over the world (Audretsch, 
Lehmann and Schenkenhofer 2018; Witt and Carr 2014; Yoon 2013). Their innovations often 
are radical, R&D intensive, specialized and focused on quality and product related services, 
accompanied with an outstanding process and innovation management (Witt and Carr 2014). 
Hidden champions defend and protect their competitive advantages by their speed in improving 
processes, products and services, and less on patenting activities. Their close bi-lateral 
relationships with key clients are characterized by trust and disclosure (Baker and Mazzarol 
2015), a ‘Nash-equilibrium’, where no party has an incentive to change the cooperation or 
cheat.  
Like the first companies in the Valley chose their location on the basis of real estate prices and 
the closeness to universities like Stanford University or UC Berkeley, most of the hidden 
champions are founded in rural areas. To overcome this disadvantage, hidden champions invest 
in long term relationships with their key stakeholders like banks, suppliers, customers, and their 
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employees. This requires a long-term orientation instead of a short and myopic view. In 
particular, human capital has become a scarce resource for these companies. Educating, training 
and employee retention has thus become major challenge for the leadership of hidden 
champions until now. By producing high quality and value adding goods and services, they 
create lock-in effects for customers and suppliers. Complementary to investments in R&D, 
these companies invest in superior training and education for their workforce. While these 
trainings and skills may be perceived as firm-specific, they do not create a hold-up or lock-in 
effect as proposed by theory. The opposite holds: labor mobility for the trained and educated 
employees exist. While in theory the specificity of knowledge may vary like a tetta ranging 
from ‘one’ (general human capital with infinite outside opportunities) to ‘zero’ (firm-specific 
with no outside opportunities), reality is far away from the estimated corner solutions of the 
algebraic optimization problem. Firm-specific skills, abilities and knowledge (firm-specific 
human capital), increases outside opportunities and does not restrict them. Competition for key 
employees is the law not the exception, but usually occurs in a close geographic proximity. 
Clustering of rivals may increase the competition for key employees, but also offers a larger 
and more flexible labor market.  
As shown in figure 4, most of the hidden champions are doing business in industries in the 
manufacturing and engineering sectors. These industries require a specialized and well-trained 
workforce, implying that life-long learning and the development of firm-specific skills and 
abilities are an “acceptable request and make the investment without hesitance, questioning, or 
conscious thought” (Coff and Raffiee 2015). These industries are however the complex, 
advanced technology and value-added industries, where “the currency of world trade is in” 
(Bonvillian 2017, p. 8).  
- Insert figure 4 about here – 
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4.3. Human capital and the complementary fit of unicorns and hidden champions 
Literature of strategic management centrally grounds on the rationale of an underlying fit 
between strategic choice, organizational design and context (Hambrick and Fredrickson 2001). 
It is down to this fit that only a restricted number of coherent patterns result, leading to a rather 
skewed distribution of unicorns and hidden champions. The evolution of unicorns and hidden 
champions should thus correspond to predictable relations among the given context and 
efficient choice variables, resulting in a complementarity of strategy and organizational design 
(Milgrom and Roberts 1990, 1995). Considering any pair of variables that designers, managers 
and policy makers, might determine or influence in attempting to realize performance, then two 
choice variables are complements (substitutes) when ‘doing more of one of them increases 
(decreases) the returns to doing more of the other’ (Roberts 2004, p. 34). This is the logic of 
creating strategic advantages induced by the complementarity of assets, tangible or intangible, 
leading to economies of scale, scope and core competences.  
The logic of unicorns lies within the speed of scaling their business model, within matching 
partners on platforms, like consumers and producers of goods and services (Bresnahan, 
Brynjolfsson, and Hitt 2002). The logic of hidden champions instead is based on flexibility, 
economies of scope, and core competences, and represents the characteristic ‘modern 
manufacturing’ model (Roberts 2004). Both the Silicon Valley and Main Street model of 
entrepreneurship represent two coherent patterns of choice over a very large set of policy and 
firm-specific variables, where a move of any one element is complementary with the 
corresponding move on each of the other variables. Figure 5 compares key characteristics of 
both hidden champions and unicorns and displays them at a glance. 
- Insert figure 5 about here - 
The complementary connection between general but technology specific human capital 
(computing and software programming) to new ideas and products has led to scalable business 
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models, requiring complementary equity-based financial resources to realize speed and growth 
(Brynjolfsson and Hitt 2000). The clustering of new ventures is shaped by spillover effects, 
where knowledge spills over from firms but is also absorbed by them (Audretsch and Lehmann 
2005; Levinthal 1997). Value is created by network effects, matching users by large 
investments in platform technology and mass communication. Permanently improving the 
complementarity of choice variables captures value, each additional user and each investment 
in the technology leverage the level of the whole venture. 
Public investment for hidden champions in general and specific human capital is 
complementary to the ability and training within the firm. Each dollar spent in public education 
programs increased the marginal return investments in employee training schemes. 
Empowering workers, worker initiatives and searching for continuous improvement are 
complementary with their skill base, implying that employees view the development of firm- 
and client-specific knowledge and skills as a necessary request for sustainable client 
relationships. With this in mind, it is easy to understand why employers pro-actively invest in 
their own human capital, in turn ensuring a rather flexible production, with short, customer 
tailored production runs, a permanent improvement of products and processes generated by 
long-term, and trust based relationships, in a quasi-monopolistic niche market.  
Such tri-lateral relationships, where all parties, the firm, its employees and the customers, invest 
in relationship specific investments, are increasing both the switching costs and the generated 
value of all parties. The hold-up hazard caused by the lock-in effect and opportunistic ex post 
negotiation behavior is attenuated by reputation and trust, which has been established by 
reciprocal behavior in the past. Such lock-in effects are hardly to replicate by imitators and 
generate both strategic advantages and capturing values. Market entries by incumbents occur 
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by spin-offs of employees or by incumbents, taking hidden champion firms over to appropriate 
the tangible but almost intangible assets.8  
5. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS  
In recent years, the old discussion on how and why context matters for entrepreneurship has 
gained new attention. Scholars are concerned about why entrepreneurship takes different forms 
and how and why those are shaped by different contexts (Autio, Kenney, Mustar, Siegel, and 
Wright 2014; Hoskisson, Wright, Filatotchev, and Peng 2013; Welter 2011; Welter and Gartner 
2016; Zahra, Wright, and Abdelgawad 2014), articulating the multiple dimensions of contexts, 
like geographical, institutional, technological, industrial, organizational or social, and the 
implications for the nature and extent of entrepreneurship and entrepreneurial forms (Wright, 
Coff, and Moliterno 2014). Much work has focused on analyzing variations of variables within 
a close geographical context, like the Silicon Valley, confirming that habits, reactions, 
expectations, and entrepreneurial orientation are positively shaped by a favorable and creative 
environment (Aldrich and Martinez 2015; Dalton 2004; Dequech 2013). However, less is 
known about the dynamic or temporal dimension of contexts, like human capital, its 
implications for cross-regional and cross-country effects, and how these contexts shape the 
nature, forms and extent of entrepreneurship (Landström, Harirchi, and Åström 2012; Wright 
et al. 2014). 
5.1. Focus on cross-country and cross-regional differences of entrepreneurial models 
One way is to shift the lens away from the Silicon Valley model of entrepreneurship and the 
“North American ‘taken-for-granted’ assumptions about what kinds of contexts matter” (Welter 
and Gartner 2016, p. 5). While cross-regional and cross-country studies have found that 
                                                 
8 This is reflected by the takeover waves of hidden champion firms in Germany, France and Italy in recent years, 
by Chinese and U.S companies. The takeover of Grammer, a hidden champion in the automotive sector, by 
TESLA in 2016 drastically reflects the deep roots of the buyer-supplier relationships, when former key clients of 
the target company are now becoming rivals to the merged company.  
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although millions of people participate in new venture creation, less is known about why there 
is such a large variation in start-up rates among countries (Kelley, Bosma, and Amorós 2011), 
and how and why both models of entrepreneurship differ so much among countries. The 
common story that “market-based” countries (Anglo-Saxon countries) and their liquid stock 
markets are dominating other countries (in particular the Continental European countries and 
the central planned countries) in fostering and promoting high-tech entrepreneurial firms is only 
one aspect on why contexts matters. Academic research should thus focus on different contexts 
on the macro or country level to get more insights about the emergence of entrepreneurial forms, 
its nature and extent. While the provision of financial capital is obviously an important issue 
and financial laws are an important context variable, the same attention should also be spent on 
the provision of human capital and the skewed distribution of general and specific human 
capital among geographical areas. Since financial assets and human capital are strong 
complementarities, increasing one choice variable does necessarily require an increase in the 
other variable, specifically human capital. Entrepreneurship scholars should shift their focus 
from the financial side of new venture creation to the human capital dimension, combining both 
critical resources as complementary assets.  
While the last decades have brought important financial innovations, reorganizing the financial 
sector, the reorganization of work and its implication on new venture creation and growth has 
almost been neglected. The ‘skill-biased technological change’ in the ICT sector favored skilled 
labor in all countries, but in particular, where the workers used these technologies, and 
governments invested in public education and training programs like in Continental Europe or 
China. Consequently, jobs were outsourced and offshored and the new organization of 
production and work led to a polarization of work, whereby the employment shares of the high- 
and low wage jobs have expanded at the expense of the middle wage jobs (Bonvillian 2017). 
One instrument to overcome this problem is fostering and promoting new venture creation in 
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rural areas (Korsgaard, Müller, and Wittorff Tanvig 2015). Though knowing that entrepreneurs 
and small and medium sized firms create economic growth in their communities, little is known 
about how to build rural economies with entrepreneurship (Welter et al. 2017). While country-
level characteristics, like different law-systems, often appear stable over time, there are 
continuous changes in the endowment of human capital and social and cultural norms that 
enable and constrain entrepreneurial activity on the local level (McMullen, Wood, and Kier 
2016). In this sense, the perception of human capital, either being general or firm-specific, and 
its implication for public or private investment (Coff and Raffiee 2015), differs across countries 
and regions and thus may be locally incorporated as a social or cultural norm.  
5.2. Combining the Silicon Valley Model of entrepreneurship with the Main Street 
Model  
The organization of work in advanced and industrialized countries is changing in both 
manufacturing and ICT technology. Recent innovations illustrate that combining both models 
of entrepreneurship, linking manufacturing to ICT, will determine the future of manufacturing 
and production and the competitiveness of countries and regions. Labeled as “Industry 4.0”, 
this fourth industrial revolution characterizes the interplay of production technologies and 
internet, mobile and cloud computing, leading to an exchange of information in real time, 
decentralized organization of production, and individual and customer specific flexible orders 
and services. Industry 4.0 encompasses all industry sectors and offers a broad field for new 
venture creation beyond the scalable platform models of unicorns.  
For a variety of reasons, the news is that both systems complement and enrich each other. 
Unicorns and Main Street hidden champions cooperate in input and output markets. As De 
Massis et al. (2016) argue, such a division of labor not only improves production technology 
and processes for both types of firms but also leads to the dissemination of knowledge and 
know-how. High-tech Silicon Valley entrepreneurship and Main Street entrepreneurship should 
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thus be seen as complements, where the first has been overestimated in the literature in the past 
decades at the expense of the latter. Reviewing the factor analysis Kuratko, Montagno, and 
Hornsby (1990) ran to assess determinants on developing the ideal climate for entrepreneurial 
behavior, the similarity of offers and needs regarding the business model of hidden champions 
is nothing but eye-catching. In this vein, the literature on corporate entrepreneurship quotes 
management support, organizational structure, and reward and resource availability as core 
ingredients for staying competitive (Kuratko et al. 1990, Hornsby, Kuratko, and Zahra 2002; 
Kuratko, Hornsby, and Covin 2014). Taking a closer look, much of this literature revolves 
around the concept of entrepreneurial orientation (EO) that along the three underlying 
dimensions of innovativeness, risk-taking, and pro-activeness, describes the extent of firms 
preparing to keep up with strategic renewal (Covin and Slevin 1991; Lumpkin and Dess 1996; 
Morris, Kuratko, and Covin 2011). Against this backdrop, we urge future research to reconsider 
the broad theory of corporate entrepreneurship and to align its concern to the case of hidden 
champions. In the age of Industry 4.0, the management and leadership of knowledge workers 
is becoming increasingly important (Hecklau, Galeitzke, Flachs, and Kohl 2016). Unicorns and 
hidden champions should take opportunities to cooperate and learn from each other, creating 
value and strengthening their competitive advantages in symbiosis.  
6. CONCLUSION 
This study introduced Main Street entrepreneurship as field of study and is meant to thwart 
entrepreneurship research from over-emphasizing high-tech entrepreneurship. We argue that 
both models of entrepreneurship, the Silicon Valley as well as the Main Street counterpart have 
their shining beacon firms and contribute to large parts of economic growth and welfare. By 
comparing both models, we point out why the global distribution of hidden champions and 
unicorns follows systematic patterns. Recognizable and predictable relations exist between the 
entrepreneurship models on the one hand and the context, the variables of strategy and the 
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organization on the other. Arguing that the ‘entrepreneurial mania’ has rooted in a ‘human 
capital mania’, we show that political decisions made in the 1960s influenced the evolvement 
of two different models, categorized and distinguished especially by their divergent view on 
human capital investments.  
Both scholars and corporate leaders receive clear messages from this research. The latter are 
welcomed to learn from the examples of excellence. We invite SMEs, rural companies, family 
businesses and exporting mid-sized companies to reevaluate their strategic fit against the 
mentioned choice variables. Managers and decision-makers in companies thus should focus on  
their internal strengths and keep their eyes open for the opportunities arising from contextual 
contingencies. Moreover, investment in firm-specific human capital withholds the potential to 
stimulate both industries and regions, but essentially depends on the institutional framework. 
Therefore, policy-makers are also in charge of standing in for SMEs and their flagship of hidden 
champions, hearing their needs so that they are not completely overshadowed by multinationals 
and unicorns. Following Baker and Welter (2015) that entrepreneurship policy is not the one 
and only instrument for an economy to become competitive and innovative, we plead for a 
general rethinking in academia that not just high-tech entrepreneurship’s unicorns are worthy 





Figure 1 Hidden champions vs. unicorns worldwide
 
Source: own depiction, data of hidden champions retrieved from Rammer and Spielkamp (2015), data of 
unicorns from http://fortune.com/unicorns/ 
 
 
Figure 2 Hidden champions and the centralization of educational systems
 















































































































































































Figure 3 Country Overview regarding the Centralization of Vocational Education 




Figure 4 Distribution of hidden champions across industries (2006-2012) 
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Figure 5 Unicorns and hidden champions at a glance 
 
Source: own depiction 
  
 Unicorns Hidden Champions 
Location metropolitan areas, dense clusters rural, small homogenous clusters 
Financial capital equity based (venture capital, angel 
investors, equity shares, IPO) 
relationship banking; internal capital 
markets (cash flows, liquidity) 
Human capital general, technology specific, high 
turnover rate 
firm and customer specific, low 
turnover rate 
Leadership charismatic stewardship, patriarchal 
Competitive advantage ubiquity in matching markets (two-
sided-markets) 
uniqueness of products and services 
Value creation mathematical algorithms in two-sided-
markets 
relationship specific investment 
Competition price competition, cost leadership, 
matching competition 
niche market leadership, quality 
competition, co-opetition among 
rivals  
Strategy  ‘innovate here - produce there’, 
disintegrated value chain, outsourcing 
(low cost/low tax countries) 
‘innovate here - produce here’, 
integrated value chain 
Capturing values (over-)investment in 
platformtechnologies; cross- and multi 
channel selling 
lock-in effects of customers 
Growth opportunities high scalable business model  
New market entry  through copy & paste by reduced 
transaction costs 
entry by take-overs 
30 
 















































Acs, Z. J., Braunerhjelm, P., Audretsch, D. B., & Carlsson, B. (2009). The knowledge 
spillover theory of entrepreneurship. Small Business Economics, 32(1), 15-30. 
Acs, Z. J., Stam, E., Audretsch, D. B., & O’Connor, A. (2017). The lineages of the 
entrepreneurial ecosystem approach. Small Business Economics, 49(1), 1-10. 
Aldrich, H. E., & Martinez, M. (2015). Why aren’t entrepreneurs more creative? Conditions 
affecting creativity and innovation in entrepreneurial activity. In C. E. Shalley, M. A. 
Hitt & J. Zhou (Eds.), Oxford Handbook on Creativity, Innovation, and 
Entrepreneurship (pp. 445-456). New York: Oxford University Press. 
Almeida, P., & Kogut, B. (1997). The Exploration of Technological Diversity and Geographic 
Localization in Innovation: Start-Up Firms in the Semiconductor Industry. Small 
Business Economics, 9(1), 21-31. 
Audretsch, D. B. (2009). The entrepreneurial society. Journal of Technology Transfer, 34(3), 
245-254. 
Audretsch, D. B., & Keilbach, M. (2004). Entrepreneurship Capital and Economic 
Performance. Regional Studies, 38(8), 949-959. 
Audretsch, D. B. & Lehmann, E. E. (2004). Dept or Equity: The role of Venture Capital in 
financing high-tech firms in Germany, Schmalenbach Business Review, 56, 340-357. 
Audretsch, D. B., & Lehmann, E. E. (2005). Does the Knowledge Spillover Theory of 
Entrepreneurship hold for regions? Research Policy, 34(8), 1191-1202. 
Audretsch, D. B., & Lehmann, E. E. (2016). The seven secrets of Germany: Economic 
resilience in an era of global turbulence. New York, USA: Oxford University Press. 
Audretsch, D. B., Lehmann, E. E. & Schenkenhofer, J. (2018). Internationalization Strategies 
of Hidden Champions: Lessons from Germany, Multinational Business Review, 26(1), 
2-24.  
Audretsch, D. B., & Thurik, R. (2004). A model of the entrepreneurial economy: Papers on 
entrepreneurship, growth and public policy. 
Autio, E., Kenney, M., Mustar, P., Siegel, D., & Wright, M. (2014). Entrepreneurial 
innovation: The importance of context. Research Policy, 43(7), 1097-1108. 
Autor, D. H. (2014). Skills, education, and the rise of earnings inequality among the" other 99 
percent". Science, 344(6186), 843-851. 
Baker, T. & Welter, F. (2015), Bridges to the future of entrepreneurship research. In Baker, T. 




Baker, S., & Mazzarol, T. (2015). The Australian manufacturing Mittelstand: an initial 
exploration. Retrieved from http://research-repository.uwa.edu.au/en/publications/the-
australian-manufacturing-mittelstand-an-initial-exploration(14bbe27f-dc22-467e-
8770-a558d2a35421)/export.html. Accessed 25 July 2017. 
Becker, G. S. (1964). Human capital: a theoretical and empirical analysis, with special 
reference to education. Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press. 
Bonvillian, W. B. (2017). Advanced Manufacturing: A New Policy Challenge. Annals of 
Science and Technology Policy, 1(1), 1-131. 
Bosch, G., & Charest, J. (2008). Vocational training and the labour market in liberal and 
coordinated economies. Industrial relations journal, 39(5), 428-447. 
Bradley, S. W., & Klein, P. (2016). Institutions, Economic Freedom, and Entrepreneurship: 
The Contribution of Management Scholarship. The Academy of Management 
Perspectives, 30(3), 211-221. 
Bresnahan, T. F., Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. M. (2002). Information Technology, Workplace 
Organization, and the Demand for Skilled Labor: Firm-Level Evidence. The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, 117(1), 339-376. 
Bruton, G. D., Ahlstrom, D., & Li, H.-L. (2010). Institutional Theory and Entrepreneurship: 
Where Are We Now and Where Do We Need to Move in the Future? 
Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 34(3), 421-440. 
Brynjolfsson, E., & Hitt, L. M. (2000). Beyond Computation: Information Technology, 
Organizational Transformation and Business Performance. The Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, 14(4), 23-48. 
Campbell, B. A., Coff, R., & Kryscynski, D. (2012). Rethinking Sustained Competitive 
Advantage from Human Capital. Academy of Management review, 37(3), 376-395. 
Coff, R., & Raffiee, J. (2015). Toward a Theory of Perceived Firm-Specific Human Capital. 
The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29(3), 326-341. 
Covin, J. G., & Slevin, D. P. (1991). A conceptual model of entrepreneurship as firm 
behavior. Entrepreneurship: Theory and Practice, 16(1), 7-24. 
Dalton, R. J. (2004). Democratic challenges, democratic choices. New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
De Massis, A., Audretsch, D. B., Uhlaner, L., & Kammerlander, N. (2017). Innovation with 
Limited Resources: Management Lessons from the German Mittelstand. Journal of 
Product Innovation Management, 35(1), 125-146. 
33 
 
De Massis, A., Frattini, F., Kotlar, J., Petruzzelli, A. M., & Wright, M. (2016). Innovation 
Through Tradition: Lessons From Innovative Family Businesses and Directions for 
Future Research. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 30(1), 93-116. 
Decker, R. A., Haltiwanger, J., Jarmin, R. S., & Miranda, J. (2016). Where has all the 
skewness gone? The decline in high-growth (young) firms in the U.S. European 
Economic Review, 86, 4-23. 
Dequech, D. (2013). Economic institutions: explanations for conformity and room for 
deviation. Journal of Institutional Economics, 9(1), 81-108. 
Evans, D. S., & Jovanovic, B. (1989). An Estimated Model of Entrepreneurial Choice under 
Liquidity Constraints. Journal of Political Economy, 97(4), 808-827. 
Fleming, P. (2017). The Human Capital Hoax: Work, Debt and Insecurity in the Era of 
Uberization. Organization Studies, 38(5), 691-709. 
Friedman, M. (1962). Capitalism and freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
German Federal Ministry of Education and Research. (2018). The German Vocational 
Training System. Retrieved from https://www.bmbf.de/en/the-german-vocational-
training-system-2129.html. Accessed 10 June 2018. 
Goldin, C. D., & Katz, L. F. (2009). The race between education and technology: Harvard 
University Press. 
Greinert, W.-D. (2005). Mass vocational education and training in Europe: classical models 
of the 19th century and training in England, France and Germany during the first half 
of the 20th. Office for Official Publications of the European Communities. 
Groysberg, B. (2010). Chasing stars: The myth of talent and the portability of performance: 
Princeton University Press. 
Groysberg, B., Lee, L.-E., & Nanda, A. (2008). Can They Take It With Them? The Portability 
of Star Knowledge Workers' Performance. Management science, 54(7), 1213-1230. 
Hambrick, D. C., & Fredrickson, J. W. (2001). Are you sure you have a strategy? The 
Academy of Management Executive, 15(4), 48-59. 
Harhoff, D., & Kane, T. J. (1997). Is the German apprenticeship system a panacea for the US 
labor market? Journal of Population Economics, 10(2), 171-196. 
Hecklau, F., Galeitzke, M., Flachs, S., & Kohl, H. (2016). Holistic Approach for Human 
Resource Management in Industry 4.0. Procedia CIRP, 54, 1-6. 




Holtz-Eakin, D., Joulfaian, D., & Rosen, H. S. (1994). Sticking it Out: Entrepreneurial 
Survival and Liquidity Constraints. Journal of Political Economy, 102(1), 53-75. 
Hornsby, J.S., Kuratko, D.F., & Zahra, S.A. (2002). Middle managers’ perception 
of the internal environment for corporate entrepreneurship: Assessing a 
measurement scale. Journal of Business Venturing, 17(3), 49-63. 
Hoskisson, R. E., Wright, M., Filatotchev, I., & Peng, M. W. (2013). Emerging 
Multinationals from Mid-Range Economies: The Influence of Institutions and Factor 
Markets. Journal of Management Studies, 50(7), 1295-1321. 
Jahn, V. (2015). The importance of Mittelstand firms for regional apprenticeship activity: 
Lessons for policy: Diskussionspapier, Helmut-Schmidt-Universität, Fächergruppe 
Volkswirtschaftslehre. 
Kelley, D. J., Bosma, N., & Amorós, J. (2011). Global entrepreneurship monitor: Global 
report 2010. Global Entrepreneurship Research Association. 
Klepper, S. (2011). Nano-economics, spinoffs, and the wealth of regions. Small Business 
Economics, 37(2), 141. 
Korsgaard, S., Müller, S., & Wittorff Tanvig, H. (2015). Rural entrepreneurship or 
entrepreneurship in the rural – between place and space. International Journal of 
Entrepreneurial Behavior & Research, 21(1), 5-26. 
Kuhlee, D. (2015). Federalism and corporatism: On the approaches of policy-making and 
governance in the dual apprenticeship system in Germany and their functioning today. 
Research in Comparative and International Education, 10(4), 476-492. 
Kuratko, D. F., Montagno, R. V., & Hornsby, J. S. (1990). Developing an Intrapreneurial 
Assessment Instrument for an Effective Corporate Entrepreneurial Environment. 
Strategic Management Journal, 11, 49-58. 
Kuratko, D.F., Hornsby, J.S., & Covin, J.G. (2014). Diagnosing a firm’s internal 
environment for corporate entrepreneurship. Business Horizons, 57(1), 37-47. 
La Porta, R., Lopez-de-Silanes, F., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1998). Law and Finance. 
Journal of Political Economy, 106(6), 1113-1155. 
Landström, H., Harirchi, G., & Åström, F. (2012). Entrepreneurship: Exploring the 
knowledge base. Research Policy, 41(7), 1154-1181. 
Le Breton-Miller, I., & Miller, D. (2006). Why Do Some Family Businesses Out-Compete? 
Governance, Long-Term Orientations, and Sustainable Capability. Entrepreneurship 
Theory and Practice, 30(6), 731-746. 
35 
 
Lehmann, E. E. & Neuberger, D. (2001). Do Lending Relationships Matter? Evidence from 
Bank Survey Data, Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 45, 339-359. 
Lehmann, E. E. & Weigand, J. (2000). Does the Governed Corporation perform better? 
Governance Structures and Corporate Performance in Germany, Review of Finance, 
4(2), 157-195. 
Levinthal, D. A. (1997). Adaptation on Rugged Landscapes. Management science, 43(7), 
934-950. 
Lewis, T. (2007). The problem of cultural fit – what can we learn from borrowing the German 
Dual System? Compare, 37(4), 463-477. 
Litan, R. E., & Hathaway, I. (2017). Is America Encouraging the Wrong Kind of 
Entrepreneurship? Harvard Business Review, Economics Digital Article. Retrieved 
from https://hbr.org/2017/06/is-america-encouraging-the-wrong-kind-of-
entrepreneurship. Accessed 20 June 2017.  
Lumpkin, G. T., & Dess, G. G. (1996). Clarifying the Entrepreneurial Orientation Construct 
and Linking It to Performance. The Academy of Management Review, 21(1), 135-172. 
McMullen, J. S., Wood, M. S., & Kier, A. S. (2016). An Embedded Agency Approach to 
Entrepreneurship Public Policy: Managerial Position and Politics in New Venture 
Location Decisions. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 30(3), 222-246. 
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1990). The Economics of Modern Manufacturing: Technology, 
Strategy, and Organization. The American Economic Review, 80(3), 511-528. 
Milgrom, P., & Roberts, J. (1995). Complementarities and fit strategy, structure, and 
organizational change in manufacturing. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 19(2), 
179-208. 
Molloy, J. C., & Barney, J. B. (2015). Who Captures the Value Created with Human Capital? 
A Market-Based View. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 29(3), 309-325. 
Morelix, A., Tareque, I., Fairlie, R. W., Russell, J., & Reedy, E. (2016). The Kauffman Index 
2016: Main Street Entrepreneurship Metropolitan Area and City Trends (November 
2016). Retrieved from https://ssrn.com/abstract=2872903. 
Morris, M. H., Kuratko, D. F., & Covin, J. G. (2011). Corporate Entrepreneurship & 
Innovation. Mason, OH: Thomson South-Western. 
Morris, M.H., Neumeyer, X., & Kuratko, D.F. (2015). A Portfolio Perspective on 




Nyberg, A. J., & Wright, P. M. (2015). 50 Years of Human Capital Research: Assessing What 
We Know, Exploring Where We Go. The Academy of Management Perspectives, 
29(3), 287-295. 
Rammer, C., & Spielkamp, A. (2015). Hidden Champions-Driven by Innovation: Empirische 
Befunde auf Basis des Mannheimer Innovationspanels: ZEW-Dokumentation. 
Roberts, J. (2004). The Modern Firm: Organizational Design for Performance and Growth. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Simon, H. (1990). Hidden Champions: Spearheads of the German Economy. Zeitschrift fuer 
Betriebswirtschaft (ZfB), 60(9), 875-890. 
Simon, H. (2009). Hidden champions of the 21st century: Success strategies of unknown 
market leaders. Heidelberg, Germany: Springer-Verlag. 
Stiglitz, J. E., & Weiss, A. (1981). Credit Rationing in Markets with Imperfect Information. 
The American Economic Review, 71(3), 393-410. 
U.S. Census Bureau (2017). Business Dynamics Statistics. Retrieved from 
https://www.census.gov/ces/dataproducts/bds/overview.html. Accessed 20 June 2017. 
Wadhwani, D. R. (2017). Entrepreneurship in historical context: Using History to develop 
theory and understanding process. In: Welter, F., & Gartner, W. B. (eds). A research 
agenda for entrepreneurship and context (pp. 65-78). Cheltenham: Edward Elgar 
Publishing. 
Welter, F. (2011). Contextualizing Entrepreneurship—Conceptual Challenges and Ways 
Forward. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 35(1), 165-184. 
Welter, F., Baker, T., Audretsch, D. B., & Gartner, W. B. (2017). Everyday 
Entrepreneurship—A Call for Entrepreneurship Research to Embrace Entrepreneurial 
Diversity. Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 41(3), 311-321. 
Welter, F., & Gartner, W. B. (2016). A research agenda for entrepreneurship and context. 
Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing. 
Williamson, O. E. (1975). Markets and hierarchies, analysis and antitrust implications. New 
York: Simon & Schuster. 
Witt, A., & Carr, C. (2014). Success secrets shared: Learning from the best Mittelstand and 
British global niche champions. Scottish Policy Now, 8(1). 
Wright, P. M., Coff, R., & Moliterno, T. P. (2014). Strategic Human Capital. Journal of 
Management, 40(2), 353-370. 
37 
 
Yoon, B. (2013). How do Hidden Champions differ from Normal Small and Medium 
Enterprises (SMEs) in Innovation Activities. Journal Of Applied Sciences Research, 
9(13), 6257-6263. 
Zahra, S. A., Wright, M., & Abdelgawad, S. G. (2014). Contextualization and the 
advancement of entrepreneurship research. International Small Business Journal, 
32(5), 479-500. 
Zellweger, T. M., & Sieger, P. (2012). Entrepreneurial orientation in long-lived family firms. 
Small Business Economics, 38(1), 67-84. 
Zuckerman, M. B. (1998). A Second American Century. Foreign Affairs, 77(3), 18-31. 
 
